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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things has conjured up a storm in the technology world by providing
novel methods to connect, exchange, aggregate, and monitor data across a system
of inter-related devices and entities. Of the myriad technologies that aid in the
functioning of these IoT devices, Bluetooth Low Energy also known as BLE plays
a major role in establishing inter-connectivity amongst these devices. This thesis
aims to provide a background on BLE, the type of attacks that could occur in an
IoT setting, the possible defenses that are available to prevent the occurrence of such
attacks, and a discussion on the research trends that hold great promise in presenting
seamless solutions to integrate IoT devices across different industry verticals.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Internet Of Things (IoT) is an upcoming technology which has gained traction in
the recent years due to rapid advancements in various areas such as embedded system
design, sensors, hardware support, software protocols and communication infrastruc-
tures. IoT can be loosely referred to as a conglomerate of sensors, actuators and
embedded chips spread out across various commodity appliances, locomotives, and
devices such as computers, mobile phones and complex human-computer interfaces
which communicate with each other to accomplish a specific task. A more formal
definition from [35] defines IoT as follows:
”The Internet of things (IoT) is the network of physical devices, vehicles, and
other items embedded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators, and network
connectivity which enable these objects to collect and exchange data.”
A report by Gartner [30] reveals that there will be 8.4 billion IoT devices by the
end of 2017. Further, Gartner predicts the number of IoT devices to breach the
20 billion mark by 2020. IoT plays a vital role in many fields such as healthcare,
military, manufacturing, smart homes, and security etc. Of the many technologies
that are available to assist inter-connectivity amongst the IoT devices, BLE is poised
to be a key player in the IoT space due to its recent progress.
With the introduction of Bluetooth 5.0 specification, there is a sizable impact to
be made by adopting the benefits provided by the new Bluetooth protocol stack for
resource-constrained devices. More often than not, IoT devices are often held back
by their limitation to computational power and energy efficiency. In order to alleviate
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this issue, BLE has become a major contestant for providing seamless solutions to
integrate IoT devices across multiple industry verticals.
Careful measures must be taken when designing applications which partake in
mission-critical operations. With rapid progression in the number of devices that
partake in the IoT ecosystem, there is also a growing concern about the state of
security for these IoT devices. A report by [10] disclosed that millions of IoT devices
were left unprotected and exposed to unfettered malicious access by an adversary.
Security is a serious liability when considering the current IoT ecosystem. In most
cases, security takes a backseat for enabling smooth user experience. This, in turn,
creates an incentive for a malicious adversary to target the IoT devices. In order
to address the lack of security in current IoT ecosystem, this thesis talks about the
looming threats that the IoT devices face and the possible countermeasures that could
be deployed to mitigate the chance of a successful attack.
1.1 Scope of Thesis
The scope of the thesis is provided in the following section:
• A comprehensive background on the BLE technology that supports communi-
cation between the IoT devices.
• A systematic classification of IoT threats and possible countermeasures that
could be adopted to thwart off the occurrence of a successful attack.
• Identify and provide a discussion on future research trends that hold great
promise to contribute to the improvement of the current IoT ecosystem.
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1.2 Document Structure
• Chapter 2 discusses the background on the BLE technology that facilitates
inter-connectivity amongst the IoT devices.
• Chapter 3 describes the different kinds of threats and classification of those
attacks in an IoT setting.
• Chapter 4 describes the different countermeasures for mitigating the occurrence
of successful attacks.
• Chapter 5 provides a discussion on emerging research ideas and related work.
• Chapter 6 provides ending remarks and concludes this thesis.
3
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Bluetooth started as a research project set in motion by telecommunications giant
Ericsson. It became a technology standard for enabling wireless devices to exchange
data over short distances. It was used in the creation of Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (WPAN). A group of telecommunication vendors and manufacturers collabo-
rated to form an organization called as the Bluetooth Special Interest Group(SIG).
The SIG holds oversight on the Bluetooth protocol standards and also provides cer-
tification to device manufacturers. This chapter provides brief information on the
progress of Bluetooth, the importance it holds in the current IoT ecosystem and
finally the entire protocol stack to further understand its potential impact.
2.1 Bluetooth Specification History
The following section provides a brief history on the timeline for each bluetooth
specification.
Timeline Snapshot Initial versions of Bluetooth specification v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2
had incremental improvements with respect to hardware and software changes. Blue-
tooth versions 1.1 and 1.2 were later ratified as the IEEE 802.15.1 standard in 2002
and 2005 respectively. Features such as Host Control Interface, Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI), flow control and retransmission modes in L2CAP layer
were introduced in these initial versions.
Bluetooth v2.0 specification was released in 2004. The new version provided a
faster and better data transfer rate by leveraging the power of Gaussian frequency-
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Figure 2.1: Bluetooth Specification Timeline.
shift keying (GFSK) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK). Bluetooth v2.1 specification
came out with a pairing model called Secure Simple Pairing in 2007.
Specification of Bluetooth v3.0 was adopted as the IEEE 802.15.1 standard in
2009. The specification mainly consisted of an alternative MAC/PHY feature which
would be used for larger data transfers by switching to an 802.11 device. Other
features such as Enhanced Reliable Transmission Modes (ERTM), enhanced power
control and unicast connectionless data were also included.
Bluetooth 4.0 specification got adopted as the new standard in 2010. This specifi-
cation introduced the Bluetooth Low Energy Mode. It provided support for establish-
ing short range communication in resource-constrained devices. With the introduction
of BLE, bluetooth devices were classified into the following modes:
• BR/EDR Mode
• Single Mode
• Dual Mode
5
Figure 2.2: Bluetooth Device Modes [28].
BR/EDR Mode Devices that support BR/EDR Mode are usually called by the
trademark name Bluetooth Classic. They support high data transfer rates and are
usually supported by smartphones,laptops and computers.
Single Mode Devices that operate under single mode usually have the protocol
stack of BLE. They are called by the trademark name Bluetooth Smart. They provide
low latency, low power consumption at the cost of reduced data transfer rate. They are
usually used for wearables and other sensor devices which have limitations on battery
usage. Most of these devices can only communicate with devices which operate in
the same protocol and cannot connect with Bluetooth Classic Devices.
Dual Mode Devices that support both BR/EDR and BLE protocol stacks oper-
ate in the dual mode. They are called by the trademark name Bluetooth Smart
Ready. These devices have the ability to communicate with both Bluetooth Classic
and Bluetooth Smart device.
In 2013, Bluetooth v4.1 was released. It was an incremental software update with
no changes to hardware. It mainly provided co-existence support for LTE networks,
improving the data exchange rates and providing flexibility to developers by enabling
6
multiple roles for Bluetooth devices. Bluetooth v4.2 was released in 2014 with support
for IPv6 and additional security mechanism for protecting privacy of the device in
LE mode. Pairing mechanisms were updated to use Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) to prevent MITM attacks during the pairing process of the devices.
Bluetooth 5.0 specification was announced in 2016. Features such as extended
range, improved data transfer rates of upto 2 Mbps and LE channel advertising and
selection filters were rolled out in the new specification. These features provided
Bluetooth with the necessary arsenal to make it a serious contender for establishing
communication between IoT devices.
2.2 Bluetooth Low Energy
BLE mode resonates with the energy requirements of IoT devices and is suitable
for the limited computational power that is available in the IoT devices. It is of
paramount importance to understand the components of the BLE protocol stack to
understand the ramifications in the event of an attack. A detailed outlook on the
bluetooth protocol stack is presented in the following section.
Figure 2.3 shows us the various components in the BLE protocol stack.
Controller
The controller consists of the components mentioned in the section below.
Physical Layer The physical layer mainly consists of the hardware components
such as radio and communication circuits that assist in conversion of digital signals
to RF waves. The BLE device has access to 37 data channels which it can hop
for transmitting data packets. They have access to 3 different advertising channels
indexed at 37, 38 and 39 which are used to transmit advertising packets. The hop
7
Figure 2.3: BLE Protocol Stack.
values are known to the device during connection establishment and varies for every
other subsequent connection. The next channel to hop is calculated using the formula:
channel = ( curr channel + hop ) mod 37
Link Layer The Link Layer interfaces with the Physical layer and takes care of all
the heavy lifting to be done in order to keep in compliance with the timing require-
ments. This is accomplished with the help of real-time hardware and software which
comes in-built by the device manufacturer. The main responsibilities of this layer is
to support encryption, maintain link state of the radio, perform data whitening and
to assist in CRC generation and verification.
Link layer also defines roles that a device can have which is shown in Table 2.1.
Another logical way of grouping these roles are as follows:
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Role Description
Advertiser Device that advertises packets
Master Device that initiates a connection
Scanner Device that scans for advertisement packets
Slave Device that accepts a connection
Table 2.1: Link Layer Roles.
• Active connection - Master and Slave
• Inactive connection - Advertiser and Scanner
Host Controller Interface “ The Host Controller Interface is a standard protocol
that allows for the communication between a host and a controller to take place across
a serial interface ” [28]. The HCI is used for interfacing the Host with the Controller
using components such as UART, USB or SDIO.
Host
The Host is comprised of the components that are mentioned in the following section.
L2CAP The Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol plays an important role
in the BLE stack. It is responsible for breaking down a large packet of information
from upper layers into manageable BLE-sized chunks. The chunks are usually 27 bytes
long. L2CAP also helps in combining the smaller BLE packets into a single large data
packet that can be sent to the upper layers. This process is known as fragmentation
and recombination. L2CAP services the ATT and SMP protocol thereby acting as a
protocol multiplexer.
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ATT The Attribute protocol acts a client/server protocol. It is stateless and gener-
ally uncompromising with respect to sequencing of requests. The attribute protocol
is responsible for the following operations:
• Error Handling
• Server Configuration
• Finding Information
• Read/Write Operations
• Asynchronous Server Intitiated Operations
Security Manager Security Manager acts both as a security algorithm as well as
a protocol. The responsibility of this layer is to assist the device in generating and
exchanging security keys to establish an encrypted communication channel. Security
Manager defines two roles namely: Initiator and Responder which corresponds to the
Link Layer Master and Slave respectively. Security Manager partakes in the following
security procedures:
• Pairing —A procedure where a temporary key is exchanged to switch to a secure
encrypted link.
• Bonding —A procedure where a sequence of key exchanges occur to generate a
long term key that is to be used for setting up a secure encrypted channel.
• Encryption Re-establishment —A procedure that is triggered when both par-
ticipants of the connection have encryption keys stored. It is used to set up an
encrypted connection without undergoing pairing or bonding procedure.
Security Manager contains a list of security keys that are used for establishing a
secure connection. The keys and their usage is listed in Table 2.2
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Keys Distributor Usage Acceptor Usage
LTK, EDIV, Rand (Encryption) Used to encrypt the link
when a slave
Used to encrypt the link
when a master
IRK, BD ADDR (Privacy) Used to generate resolvable
private addresses
Used to resolve resolvable
privaSM Key Usagete ad-
dresses
CSRK (Signing) Used to sign data Used to verify signatures
Table 2.2: Security Manager Key Usage [28].
Pairing Algorithms The Security Manager has the following pairing algorithms
at its disposal for establishing a connection.
Legacy Pairing Key exchange occurs in unencrypted plain text format. Devices
in communication should enter the same PIN key to establish a connection. Usually
the PIN is pre-determined by the manufacturer. This method of pairing is opted for
achieving interoperability with Bluetooth 2.0 devices and its earlier versions.
Secure Simple Pairing Secure Simple Pairing came into existence from v2.1 Blue-
tooth Specification. Support for many pairing algorithms were added in this incre-
mental update. The list below describes the various pairing mechanisms that are
available.
• Just Works —No user interaction is enforced in this type of pairing. This pairing
mechanism is used when one of the device has no input or output capability.
This pairing mechanism is susceptible to MITM attacks.
• Passkey Entry —User interaction maybe required in this type of pairing. This
pairing mechanism is used when only one of the device has input capability and
11
GAP Role Link Layer Role Description
Broadcaster Advertiser Device that sends advertising data packets
Central Master Device that listens for advertising packets and intitates
connection
Observer Scanner Device that listens for advertising packets
Peripheral Slave Device that sends advertising data packets and waits for
connection requests
Table 2.3: GAP Role Relation to Link Layer Role.
the other device only has output capability. This pairing mechanism is also
susceptible to MITM attacks.
• Numeric Comparison —This type of pairing enforces user interaction. This
pairing mechanism is used when both devices have the ability to display six digit
number and the user has the ability to enter yes/no. This pairing mechanism
provides protection against MITM attacks.
• Out Of Band —Uses another channel of communication such as Near Field
Communication (NFC), RFID tags, biometrics etc. This pairing mechanism
provides protection against MITM attacks.
GAP Generic Access Profile is the control layer that dictates how procedures such
as security establishment, connection, device discovery and data exchange occur be-
tween different vendor devices.
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Mode Role(s) Applicable Peer Procedure(s)
Broadcast Broadcaster Observation
Non-discoverable Peripheral N/A
Limited discoverable Peripheral Limited and General discovery
General discoverable Peripheral General discovery
Non-connectable Peripheral, broadcaster, observer N/A
Any connectable Peripheral Any connection establishment
Table 2.4: Gap modes and applicable procedures [28].
Procedure Role(s) Applicable Peer Mode(s)
Observation Observer Broadcast
Limited discovery Central Limited discoverable
General discovery Central Limited and General discoverable
Name discovery Peripheral, central N/A
Any connection establishment Central Any connectable
Connection parameter update Peripheral, central N/A
Terminate connection Peripheral, central N/A
Table 2.5: Gap procedures and their required modes [28].
Table 2.4 shows the various GAP Roles that are allowed to operate in a particular
mode and their respective applicable peer procedures.
Table 2.5 shows the various GAP roles that are allowed to perform certain proce-
dures and their respective applicable peer modes.
GATT The Generic Attribute Profile defines the ways through which the profile and
user data can be exchanged over a BLE connection. GATT uses the ATT Protocol for
transporting data between devices. There are two roles defined in the GATT protocol
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which is GATT client and GATT server. The roles are independent of the GAP roles.
Data is organized into sections called services. Services group related pieces of user
data called as characteristics.
Application Layer The Application Layer is the final layer which interfaces the
GATT layer with the application data. This data is then passed down to the respec-
tive GATT services and characteristics. Proper protection measures have to be put in
place to prevent data exposure. The application layer offers some sort of end-to-end
encryption to prevent unexpected data exposure.
In this chapter, we have seen in detail about the Bluetooth protocol stack; it’s
corresponding components and the functionality of each component. Now that we
have an understanding of how the BLE stack operates, we can proceed to identify the
various attack surface vectors and the corresponding threats in the next chapter.
14
Chapter 3
THREATS
3.1 Overview
BLE based IoT devices are more often than not susceptible to threats because of
insufficient end-to-end security. A targeted attack from an adversary could cripple the
functioning of a system dependent on these devices. In this chapter, an overview about
the different types of threats that exist in the IoT space is visited. A classification of
those threats meaningful to the subject IoT devices is described.
Figure 3.1: An Illustration of the OSI Layers Relevant to IoT Devices
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Figure 3.2: Classification of BLE Threats
3.2 Classification
This section covers the classification of threats found in BLE based IoT devices.
The classification is based on the BLE layers upon which a potential adversary could
target to perform an attack. The threats are classified as follows:
• Physical Attacks
• Network Attacks
• Application Attacks
• Social Attacks
• Encryption Attacks
16
3.2.1 Physical Attacks
This subsection of threats describe the attacks that occur on the physical layer of
the IoT device.
Jamming
Jamming attacks pose a serious threat to IoT devices by disrupting their ability to
communicate with other devices which utilizes the ISM 2.4 GHz spectrum. A targeted
disruption in this channel will render systems dependent upon the communication and
coordination of these IoT devices pointless.
Jamming attacks achieve their intended purpose by intentionally emitting radio
signals on communication channels used by the IoT devices such that the Signal-
to-Noise Ratio is skewed to disrupt the reception of messages between the devices.
Broadly speaking , jamming attacks could either be Wide-band or Pulse-band. The
former targets the entire RF spectrum that the IoT devices use, while the latter
targets specific channels which are used by the IoT devices. Variants of the Pulse-
band jamming attacks are discussed in the section below.
Constant Jamming Constant jamming attack continuously emits a jamming sig-
nal to disrupt the communication channels between the IoT devices. Although effec-
tive in accomplishing it’s desired purpose, it is highly energy inefficient because of the
continuous dispersion of the jamming signal. This jamming attack is easily detected
due to its constant disruption over IoT communication channels.
Deceptive Jamming Deceptive jamming attack emits signals at periodic intervals
to disrupt the communication channels. This type of attack is energy efficient because
the jamming frame is sent at periodic instances. Therefore disruption experienced is
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intermittent and not continuous. Since the attack is periodic it is harder to detect
when compared to a constant jamming attack.
Random Jamming Random jamming involves a combination of both Constant
and Deceptive jamming. At any given instance of time the jamming method used
could be random. Since no particular pattern is involved in this attack it makes it
harder to detect. Energy efficiency averages between the former two jamming attacks.
Reactive Jamming Reactive jamming kicks off only when the jammer senses on-
going network activity over the target channel. Channel interruption by the adversary
happens when any activity is sniffed by the jammer. The activity could be as sim-
ple as an interrupt such as a frame delimiter or looking out for change in the RSSI
threshold values. If any of these conditions occur, it triggers the jammer to perform
channel disruption. Since the attack is very specific it is much harder to detect and
generally energy efficient than the other variants of jamming attacks.
Device Cloning
This type of attack involves in creating an exact replica with capabilities and func-
tionality similar to the target device. Although not widespread, this type of attack
can occur provided the adversary has physical access to the subject device of inter-
est. Cloning could help the adversary into tricking the system to divulge sensitive
information.
Board PIN jacking
This type of attack makes the assumption that the adversary has access to the physical
hardware of the device. Certain devices hold critical information in their non-volatile
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memory which could be accessed through PINs on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB)
which are left open. Using the standard input/output PIN on the PCB of the target
device as the access point, an adversary could extract sensitive information. The
gathered information can then be used to perform various nefarious actions which
could aid the adversary in accomplishing its end goals.
Tampering
This attack involves modification of the target device in order to assist the adversary
with critical information which will lead to an exploit. Examples of this type of attack
is the modification of the point of sale terminal to capture the RFID tags which are
then relayed to the adversary through covert communication channels. Tampering
attacks requires the adversary to perform physical modifications to the target device
to assist in subterfuge of the network of IoT devices.
3.2.2 Network Attacks
This subsection of threats describe the attacks that occur on the network layer of
the IoT device.
Denial Of Service
DoS attacks are a subset of network attacks where the adversary tries to disrupt
service to the target network. This attack achieves its purpose by flooding the con-
nections with malformed connection or service requests. This flooding of requests
hogs the entire bandwidth of a particular servicing node in the target network. This
will cause the disruption of service to genuine incoming requests from various clients.
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Battery Exhaustion
Generally IoT devices are energy efficient and are made to run on the energy derived
from a single battery operated Li-ion coin cell. Battery exhaustion is another form of
exploit, which the adversary has in it’s arsenal to wreck havoc on the services rendered
by a system which is predominantly dependent on the coordination and functioning of
many devices which are located at inaccessible spots. IoT devices which operate using
BLE are specifically designed to be awake for a short period of time for conservation
of energy. When the target BLE device is bombarded with requests which actively
create a situation in which the device is prevented from reaching a sleep state, the
life expectancy of the device significantly reduces due to persistent awake state of the
device. Uher et al. [29] show that a single software defined radio attack platform
under the control of an adversary can drastically bring down the life of a BLE device
through coordinated connection attempts from an army of adversarial devices.
Man-in-the-Middle
MITM attacks usually occur in the form of eavesdropping wherein the adversary
would be able to sniff on the traffic between the IoT devices. Secure Simple Pairing
protocol between the IoT devices can be forced to adopt the Just Works mode by
manipulating the input/output capabilities of the devices. Since Just Works SSP
does not provide protection from eavesdropping and MITM attacks, the adversary
can then proceed to use the information collected from the devices to orchestrate a
targeted attack.
MAC Spoofing
Mostly recognized as the evil twin attack, this type of attack deliberately tries to
spoof the MAC address of a target device to misdirect a system dependent on the
20
information from the target device. An example of such attack is the MAC spoofing of
BLE sensor beacons which communicate with a central server to provide information
about its location. Spoofing attacks on such BLE beacons tend to corrupt the data
sent to the server thereby causing the results to be inaccurate as shown in the study
of William et al [19].
Relay
Relay attacks usually depend on the adversary’s capability to re-transmit messages
from the originator to the target device. An example of this attack in the context of
IoT devices is the relay of e-key from key fobs/mobile phones to smart locks.
3.2.3 Application Attacks
This subsection of threats describe the attacks that occur on the application layer
of the IoT device.
Password Cracking
Password Cracking can be done through brute force attacks which can be performed
online or offline. An offline brute-force password cracking attack is much more dan-
gerous due to unrestricted attempts by the adversary to decipher the password to
obtain sensitive information. Many variants of this attack such as chosen plaintext,
dictionary, known ciphertext help to achieve the desired results considerably faster
than brute force attacks.
Bluejacking
This type of attack usually occurs in Bluetooth enabled devices such as mobile phones
and laptops. Adversary initiates the attack by sending unsolicited information to the
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target user. This attack helps the adversary in performing actions such as adding
new contacts to the address book which is akin to mobile phishing and spam attacks.
Some of these attacks could elicit a vile response when the target user responds to
the specific messages sent by the adversary.
Bluebugging
This type of attack relies on a security flaw that is found on older Bluetooth devices
which enable the execution of commands unbeknownst to the user of the target device.
The execution of such covert commands will enable an adversary to start a phone
call, eavesdrop on messages, track the location of the user and other services which
are available on the compromised device.
Botnets
A botnet is a collection of compromised computers, devices and other internet con-
nected devices often referred to as zombies. These devices are infected with malware
which enables an adversary, who owns the botnet, to control the devices by means
of a covert channel such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC). They can issue commands to
perform malicious activities such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, the
sending of spam mail, and information theft.
On October 2016, Mirai botnets were used to bring down the service of popular
websites such as Netflix, Reddit and GitHub for several hours. Mirai botnet lever-
aged the weak security in DVRs, webcams and many other IoT devices to create a
formidable army of zombies ready to disrupt targets. Variants of the Mirai botnet,
namely Hajime emerged in late 2016. Hajime botnet is an improved version wherin
it has a decentralized architecture and utilizes the torrent protocols for discovery and
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infection. The botnets leverage weaknesses in application security such as default
device credentials, port exposure and spread the malware across easy targets.
3.2.4 Social Attacks
This subsection of threats describe the attacks that occur by means of social
constructs.
Social Engineering
Humans, as stated by security literature, are the weakest link in preserving the se-
curity of a system. An adversary could employ subtle psychological ploys to gauge
and extract information which might aid in performing a successful exploit. Social
Engineering is akin to phishing or spam e-mail when taken in the context of a conver-
sation with human beings. An adversary equipped with a certain understanding of
human behavior could plot complex questionnaires which will assist in the disclosure
of sensitive information which could later be used for nefarious purposes.
Careless Safekeeping
This type of attack encompasses situations wherein the passwords or sensitive infor-
mation are not properly stored. Improper safekeeping of sensitive information and
exposure of such information will often lead to situations wherein the adversary could
learn more about the target. Though this type of attack seems trivial, many security
breaches have occurred due to ignorance of best practices within an organization.
3.2.5 Encryption Attacks
Encryption attacks are unique in the fact that they are not tied to one particular
layer. This type of attack could either target a single layer or a combination of layers.
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The layers which are subject to these kinds of attacks are the Physical, Network
and Application layers. Encryption attacks mainly try to decipher the encrypted
data by sophisticated means or through plain brute force methods. When no proper
end-to-end encryption is provided the data exchanged between devices is disclosed to
potential adversaries located around those devices. Common encryption attacks are
known plaintext, chosen ciphertext or cryptanalysis attacks.
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Chapter 4
COUNTERMEASURES
This chapter describes the various countermeasures that are currently available to
help prevent the occurrence of a successful attack by an adversary.
4.1 IDS
An intrusion detection system refers to a standalone device or a software residing
on a network of devices that actively monitors traffic information for any malicious
activity or violations of security policy [36].
Detection Methods IDS aid in the detection of attacks by the following detection
methods:
Signature based detection The IDS systems compares pre-determined and known
attack patterns with suspicious network packets to detect the presence of an attack.
Figure 4.1: IDS Detection Methods
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State based detection The IDS system has a pre-compiled list or a specification
of profiles which are deemed to be benign for a set of actions or an event. A mismatch
between a current behavior and the specification will be reported as an attack.
Statistical anomaly based detection This method of detection relies on the
presence of a baseline against which the IDS can compare and monitor the network
traffic. Whenever a part of the network crosses this threshold for observed behavior
the IDS jumps in to detect and perform appropriate actions to mitigate an attack.
4.1.1 Classification of IDS
This subsection talks about the different classification of IDS based on their ar-
chitecture.
Standalone IDS architecture This IDS architecture comprises of an IDS agent
which runs independently on each node in the network. These standalone agents help
to detect intrusions independently without coordination or communication with other
IDS agents. This IDS architecture would work best for flat network infrastructure
than for multi-layered network infrastructure because of the said absence of data
exchanges between the IDS agents.
Collaborative IDS architecture This IDS architecture comprises of IDS agents
running on each node which collectively participate in intrusion detection and re-
sponse. Each IDS agent in the network must participate in the coordination and
communication of events which are local as well as global to the network it resides
in. This helps in orchestrating mitigation of any intrusion detected in the network.
Collaborative IDS agents fit well in almost any network structure because of their
clout for coordination and communication amongst a network of nodes.
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Hierarchial IDS architecture This IDS architecture comprises of IDS agents
which span across clusters in multi-layered network infrastructures. Each cluster in
the network will have a cluster head which will act similar to that of common control
points such as routers, switches and gateways. The cluster head will have the IDS
agent which helps in performing the aforementioned collaborative tasks to detect
presence of an intrusion. Hierarcial IDS agents find merit in multi-layered network
infrastructures which are separated by geographical boundaries. These IDS agents
collaborate globally and mitigate intrusion locally.
Mobile IDS architecture This IDS architecture comprises of IDS agents which
are mobile and not constrained to a particular location. The IDS agents running on
these mobile devices help in aggregating data and reporting the information to cluster
heads which will then perform collaborative tasks to detect and mitigate intrusion.
4.1.2 Existing IDS systems
The following subsection talks about the existing state of the art IDS systems that
are already available for intrusion detection and prevention [3], [12], [23].
Bayesian IDS This type of IDS system uses a game theoretic approach which
depends on a predetermined set of beliefs that the IDS agent will have in order
to make decisions on intrusion detection and prevention. The game formulation is
between a pair of attacking and defending nodes in the network. The aim of the game
is to maximize the payoff on the network of nodes by having predetermined beliefs
on whether a particular node in the network is benign or malicious. The beliefs can
be static wherein they represent a constant value for a particular set of actions or
event upon which the IDS agent is entrusted to decide and react. The beliefs can be
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dynamic wherein the values are updated to reflect the environment. The dynamic
Bayesian IDS agents fare much better than the static Bayesian IDS agents because
of their flexibility and its capability to reflect and represent real-world situations.
Classification-Based IDS This type of IDS system uses a set of supervised classifi-
cation algorithms to assist in intrusion detection and prevention. Common examples
of classification algorithms used in these IDS systems are the Multi-Layer Percep-
tron, Linear Classifier, Gaussian Mixture Model, Naive Bayes and Support Vector
Machines. A number of studies were made by comparing all these algorithms against
a set of known attacks. Of these algorithms, the Support Vector Machine model
seems to be the most accurate classification algorithm for all the attacks that were
chosen.[3]
Zone-Based IDS This type of IDS system relies on the technique of partitioning
the network into inter and intra nodes. The network is divided into zones in order
to save the bandwidth for specific sub-networks. Any node found within a particular
network is considered to be an intra-node. A local IDS agent will be aggregating and
collecting reports on that local zone to help the IDS system in taking appropriate
decisions with respect to intrusion detection and prevention. A node which acts as a
gateway to nodes in other zones is considered to be an inter-node. These nodes use
some sort of aggregation algorithms to present information of their particular zone
to other zonal IDS agents. It was found out that the local anomaly detection model
worked well for low mobility environment than high mobility environment.
Specification-Based IDS This type of IDS system uses a state-based approach to
detect the occurrence of malicious behavior within a network. The IDS system relies
on the fact that each node in the network is being tracked by a network monitor. The
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IDS system then analyzes the network traffic of the nodes to determine if there are any
discrepancies in the routing behavior by comparing the analyzed traffic with a finite
state machine model as an operative specification. This method is not pragmatic
because of mobile nodes which may or may not be covered by the network monitor.
Fuzzy Logic IDS This type of IDS system uses a computational paradigm that
helps in making reasonable decisions about uncertainty. Parameters such as the num-
ber of packets dropped, DestThreshold and SourceThreshold are fed into a mathe-
matical model to help local IDS agents predict the appropriate routing behavior. This
IDS system mostly finds its application in medical diagnosis because of its capability
to handle imprecise information and uncertainty.
Cross-Layered IDS This type of IDS system relies not only on the network layer
of a particular system but also relies on parameters that are obtained from the MAC
and the physical layer. Since the information available to the IDS agent is quite
comprehensive, this approach has better intrusion detection accuracy when compared
to other intrusion detection methods. A trade-off must be made for the overhead it
has on the network for the perceived accuracy.
4.2 Security Policy
The following section discusses the various components of security policy that
could be adopted to prevent the occurrence of a successful attack.
Blacklist A blacklist is a table or a list of nodes which are identified to be malicious
within a network. This list could be updated dynamically to reflect upon the threats
which the network might be exposed to. Broadcasting and updating this list across
29
many routers and gateways could help prevent the intrusion of threats across the
network.
Whitelist A whitelist is complementary to a blacklist. It is a list of verified devices
in a network which is deemed to be safe to interact. Whitelists help the routers and
gateways in a network to make decisions on allowing data or request packets to flow
through the network.
Resolvable Private Addresses RPAs are a solution to the most prevalent threat
of sniffing and spoofing static public device addresses in mobile ad-hoc networks.
BLE 4.2 has a mechanism to create an RPA by means of an Identity Resolving Key
(IRK) or a Peer Identity Resolving Key (IRP). Using either of these two keys RPAs
can be generated to establish a connection with master or slave devices. When a
connection request is made to a particular device, the connection will succeed only
if the initiating device finds out the RPA for the target device by using the correct
IRK. Using link layer device filtering, the RPA can be resolved and authenticated
at the link layer. If not, the connection request will fail and the device wouldn’t be
susceptible to battery exhaustion or spoofing attacks.
Link Layer Device Filtering Proper link layer device filtering has to be set up to
prevent unwanted malicious nodes from penetrating the network. Measures should be
taken to make sure that none of the devices in the network use static public addresses
unless otherwise is absolutely required and essentially harmless to the network. A
connection request will be allowed only if the RPA can be resolved and found in the
whitelist of the target device. This rule should be followed across many roles which
a BLE based IoT device might partake such as Advertiser, Scanner, and Initiator.
Only devices which have their RPAs on the whitelist should be processed [29].
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4.3 Multi-factor Authentication
Multi-factor Authentication refers to a method of access control by which an user
requesting access to a system presents multiple pieces of information or evidence to
prove the user’s authenticity. Factors that could be considered as evidence for proving
one’s authenticity are usually of the following three types:
• Type I Something that the user has.
• Type II Something the user knows.
• Type III Something the user is.
Examples of Type I could be possession of physical objects such as key fobs, physical
access cards, USB stick or a QR code [18]. Examples of Type II could be knowledge
of secrets such as PIN, time based one-time token or a simple alphanumeric 8-16 digit
secret password. Examples of Type III could be a characteristic of the user which
usually is related to bio-metric factors such as fingerprint, voice or facial recognition.
Care must be taken to ensure that the BLE based IoT devices enforce reliance
upon multiple factors of authentication rather than depending on a single factor of
authentication. This will help mitigate the successful penetration of attacks such as
brute force or password cracking because of the multiple factors involved in authenti-
cation. It is important to note that thought the attacks are mitigated by multi-factor
authentication, breaches could occur when the attack involves social engineering.
4.4 Security Tools
This section describes about the different suite of pen-testing tools that are readily
available to help secure the attack surface vectors that may possibly be left exposed
to an adversary.
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Ubertooth Ubertooth is an opensource Bluetooth test tool for experimentation
developed by Michael Ossmann and Dominic Spill. Ubertooth provides the hardware
platform necessary to perform passive monitoring of communication between blue-
tooth devices. The first version Ubertooth Zero was released in October of 2010 which
was then superseded by Ubertooth One which was released in January 2011. Uber-
tooth provides basic sniffing capabilities of the communication that happens between
BLE devices.
Wireshark Wireshark [38] is a network protocol analyzer which is widely used
across commercial, governmental, educational and non-profit enterprises to under-
stand both at a macroscopic and microscopic level the proceedings of their network.
Wireshark provides a wide variety of tools to help analyze communication that hap-
pens over a wireless or wired network. Wireshark provides rich features such as cap-
turing data from various mediums such as Ethernet, IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, USB
and many other supported communication channels. Wireshark has the capability to
support decryption for many protocols such as SSL/TLS, IPsec, SNMP, WEP and
WPA. Wireshark has the ability to output the captured communication packets into
formats such as CSV, PCAP, XML or simple plain text. The features provided by
wireshark makes it an indispensable tool for performing all kinds of security testing.
crackle crackle [24] is a decryption tool that cracks BLE encryption. crackle cap-
italizes on a flaw that occurs during the pairing process between two BLE devices
and will be able to obtain the Temporary Key (TK) from the packets captured dur-
ing the initial pairing process. Once the TK is obtained, crackle can help decrypt
the Short Term Key (STK) and Long Term Key (LTK) thereby decrypting the en-
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tire communication that happens over BLE channel. It has two modes of operation
namely:
• Crack TK
• Decrypt with LTK
Crack TK This mode requires a PCAP file which contains initial pairing conver-
sations between BLE devices. This PCAP file can be obtained by using Ubertooth
as the hardware sniffer and Wireshark as the software platform to capture the sniffed
data into PCAP format which is understandable by the crackle program. crackle
exploits the fact that the initial pairing process mostly uses Just Works mode in most
of the BLE devices which usually contains a 6-digit PIN ranging from 0 to 999999
padded to 128 bits. To analyze each connection in the input PCAP file and output
the results to stdout.
c r a c k l e − i < f i l e . pcap>
To decrypt the contents of the PCAP file use the following command:
c r a c k l e − i < f i l e . pcap> −o <out . pcap>
The output file will contain all the decrypted packets from the original PCAP file.
Decrypt with LTK This mode requires the PCAP file to contain LL ENC REQ
and LL ENC RSP and the LTK used to encrypt the communications between the two
BLE devices. To check if the PCAP file contains necessary information it requires to
perform decryption provide the following command:
c r a c k l e − i < f i l e . pcap> −l<l tk>
To output the contents of the entire PCAP file into target output file using the
following command:
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c r a c k l e − i < f i l e . pcap> −o <t a r g e t . pcap> − l <l tk>
The output file will contain all the information of the encrypted packets in a human
readable format.
4.5 Best Practices
This section talks about the best practices that a user should follow when using
a BLE-based IOT device.
Proper Bluetooth Usage Steps must be taken to ensure that BLE remains at
appropriate sleep states without actively engaging in the continuous broadcast of an
advertisement. BLE device should resume communication with another device only
if it knows for certain that the authenticity of the device is verifiable by multi-factor
authentication. In addition to that, communication should not happen with another
device unless it is part of a whitelist. Bluetooth devices operate in any of the following
security modes:
• Security Mode 1 — Promiscuous mode which accepts any connection with no
encryption or authentication. Provides no protection.
• Security Mode 2 — Authentication and encryption supported at service level
which means that security will be added after pairing occurs.
• Security Mode 3 — Similar to Security Mode2 except that the security functions
are supported at the link level. This mode provides security before a physical
link is created.
• Security Mode 4 — This mode has Secure Simple Pairing protocol which pro-
vides resistance against MITM attacks by utilizing Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
based key exchange.
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Any pairing process must enforce Security Mode 4 as it provides highest level of
security for link layer even before link establishment. Because ECDH is used, MITM
attacks are thwarted off.
Dissociate Lost or stolen Bluetooth devices Any device that is suspected to
have been lost or stolen must be dissociated from the BLE device’s whitelist. Any
further pairing with that device requires careful attention to it’s claims of authenticity.
Users should never accept transmissions from unknown or unverifiable devices.
Secure Pairing Pairing process is the weakest link in most of the BLE based
IoT devices. If possible, the pairing process should occur in a secure environment
which the user has considerable amount of control. For cases where the nature of
the environment is uncertain, user must make sure to enforce appropriate application
and link layer safety measures mentioned above.
Disabling Unused SDIO pins BLE devices that operate in mission-critical sys-
tems should make sure that their PCB shouldn’t have any SDIO pins left exposed for
an adversary to exploit. Any unused board multiplexer or RFCOMM channel should
be covered up.
Intrusion Detection System A proper IDS can help thwart off potential threats
and rectify malicious nodes in the network by analyzing the traffic flow in the network.
Updating firewall rules, frequent update and broadcast of whitelists and blacklists
throughout the entire network will help mitigate the occurrence of a breach by an
unauthorized device.
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OOB channels Pairing process can be forced to take place in OOB communication
channels such as NFC to facilitate secure transfer of session keys. Mandating the
initial pairing process over OOB channel will most likely thwart off potential threats.
A summary of the different threats and their countermeasures is described in Table
4.1.
Layer Threats Confidentiality Integrity Availability Impact Countermeasures
Physical
Jamming [7], [37] x  FHSS/DHSS, Directional Transmission
Board PIN Jacking [5] x x H# Securing PCB SDIO PIN [5]
Device Cloning [14] x H# Enforcing Physical Security
Tampering [14] x H# Surveillance
Network
DoS [4] x  Firewall, IDS, Honeypots [3], [12]
MITM [11], [17] x x H# End-to-end encryption [1], [2], [6]
MAC Spoofing [19] x x H# User authentication checks [4]
Relay [4] x x H# Integrity Checks [14]
Battery Exhaustion [4] x  Whitelist authorized devices, use RPA [13]
Application
Brute Force Password cracking [14] x x H# Multi-factor authentication [1]
Blue bugging [14] x x # Use Bluetooth 4.0+
Blue jacking [14] x x # Use Bluetooth 4.0+
Botnets [16] x  Perform Malware Analysis [26]
Social
Social Engineering [14] x x H# Follow Best Practices [14]
Careless safekeeping [14] x x H# Follow Best Practices [1]
# Low H# Moderate  High
Table 4.1: Snapshot —Threats and Countermeasures for BLE-Based IoT Devices
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
This chapter provides an analysis of the issues that hinder the progress of BLE-based
IoT devices. A discussion on emerging research trends that address these issues is
also provided in this chapter.
5.1 Analysis
With the proliferation of IoT devices in many fields, there is a real need to address
the issues that impede their progress. Usually, IoT devices are built with functionality
and user experience in mind, thereby ensuring that the users have quick turnaround
times for each interaction. In order to improve usability and user experience, security
trade-offs have to be made because the BLE-based IoT devices are not designed
to support heavyweight and computationally intensive security protocols. Attack
surfaces emerge when an imbalance occurs in the trade-off between security and user
experience. A retrospective of issues plaguing the current IoT ecosystem is analyzed.
In addition to that, research ideas that could help resolve these grievances are also
addressed in this section.
Metadata exposure Metadata is information that is used to provide additional
information about other data. Especially of importance in the context of BLE-based
IoT devices are metadata information of BLE packets such as source address, desti-
nation address and MAC address. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the root cause for a
subset of network attacks such as MAC spoofing and relay attacks is metadata expo-
sure. These attacks are perpetrated by the adversary by using metadata information
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to perform reconnaissance, modification, and misdirection of systems dependent on
these BLE-based IoT devices. A classic example of this problem is the spoofing of
BLE-beacons which provide location information. Misdirection or misinformation will
cause a decrease in the accuracy of a system dependent on these beacons. Research
work that targets ways to tackle the problem of metadata exposure will help improve
the network security of BLE-based IoT devices.
Metadata exposure can be prevented by leveraging the power of Black Software
Defined Networks. Black SDN operates on the premise that both metadata and
payload are encrypted throughout the network. Chakrabarty et al. [8], [9] proposed
a new format of BLE packets for use in Black SDN networks. Since the metadata has
to be encrypted, proper routing mechanisms have to be implemented by a Trusted
Third Party (TTP) device. In most cases, the TTP would be entrusted to be the
responsibility of the Black SDN controller. It is important to note that network
security is achieved at the cost of symmetric key management, decreased routing and
payload efficiency. Research work that targets the improvement of the performance
metrics of a Black SDN network such as better routing mechanisms, improved payload
efficiency, and reduced overhead on network traffic may present promising solutions
that could be integrated into BLE-based IoT systems.
Device Authenticity IoT networks may comprise of both static and dynamic
nodes in the network. These nodes have to be monitored to prevent a malicious
node from executing actions that cause service disruption. Attacks such as MAC
spoofing from section 3.2.2 could be mitigated by verifying the authenticity claims of
a device that is requesting access to the IoT network. Complex security protocols and
tracking mechanisms are enforced in an IoT networks to verify the authenticity of a
device. It is cumbersome for a single supervisory node in the network to keep track
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of the dynamic changes that happen over the entire IoT network. Research work that
prioritizes novel methods to verify authenticity claims of a device find a crucial role
in improving the overall security of the IoT ecosystem.
Blockchain [34] is an emerging technology that could verify the authenticity claims
of a device entering the IoT network. Blockchain is an open decentralized ledger that
holds public records of financial transactions which can be verified throughout the
network. The advantage of the blockchain is the ability to provide proof of a legal
transaction without depending on a verification response from a central authority.
The transaction is deemed legal only when a majority of the participants in the
blockchain agree upon a proof of computational work. Any new device that is trying
to gain access to the IoT network must have reached a consensus by a majority of the
participating nodes in the network which could vouch for the incoming device’s au-
thenticity. Research that targets the adaptation of blockchain to resource constrained
BLE-based IoT networks could possibly improve the security of the IoT network.
Updating security test-beds The security test-beds have to be redesigned to ac-
count for the features that are relevant to IoT networks. Sachidananda et al. [26]
proposed a IoT security test bed highlighting the features necessary to create a holis-
tic approach towards IoT risk analysis and assessment. It is of paramount importance
that security analysis be performed on both the hardware and the software of IoT
devices. Attacks from section 3.2.1 and 3.2.5 can be addressed by strengthening
the capabilities of IoT security test-beds. Research that targets penetration testing
methodologies for IoT networks, context-based attack detection models and modu-
lar test-bed architectures could possibly help improve the overall security of an IoT
network.
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Security test-beds could also leverage the power of learning models available in
artificial intelligence. An Intrusion Detection System could employ these learning
models to identify patterns of network traffic to distinguish between benign and ma-
lign data packets. Network attacks from section 3.2.2 can be mitigated by conducting
automated tests that are assisted by AI learning models. The learning models help
the IDS to identify traffic patterns that occur in the network. With the assistance of
such learning models, the IDS could play a major role in early detection and reduced
turnaround time for mitigation of perceived threats.
Secure Pairing Pairing process is the weakest link in most of the BLE-based IoT
devices. The current state-of-the-art devices do not enforce appropriate protection
mechanisms which are available in the latest Bluetooth specification. Even with
appropriate protection mechanisms available, the BLE device can be forced to choose
a weak pairing mechanism by sending different control messages during the pairing
process. In order to address this issue, innovative ways of pairing have to be explored.
Attacks from section 3.2.3 can be mitigated by exploring new venues to establish
secure pairing.
Delgado et al. [20] proposed a novel approach for the re-construction of secret
key from stable Static Random Access Memory cells available in the BLE chip. The
advantage of this novel approach is that a BLE device can leverage the intrinsically
available Physically Unclonable Function to assist in the process of secret key gener-
ation and reconstruction without any modification to its physical hardware.
Body Sensor Networks find a unique position in helping these BLE-based IoT
devices to establish pairing. Body Sensor Networks rely on the features present in
most of the BLE-based IoT devices such as fingerprint sensors and touchpads. Using
capacitive coupling, Hessar et al. [15] achieved data transfer rates of 50 bits per
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second through the human body by utilizing the capability of a body sensor network.
An example use case is the transfer of digital keys from mobile phone to smart locks
present on doors through the human body. Research that improves the data transfer
rates achieved through body sensor networks could be a game changer in providing
a secure way of transferring critical information amongst BLE-based IoT devices.
5.2 Related Work
Yasmin M. Amin and Amr T. Abdel-Hamid [4] provided a comprehensive and
taxonomic analysis of PHY and MAC layer attacks that occur on 802.15.4 devices.
The authors provided a classification relevant to Low Rate - Wireless Personal Area
Networks (LR-WPANs) which is quite different from 802.15.1 devices (Bluetooth).
A detailed explanation on the evaluation criteria and the reasoning for the classifi-
cation of the attacks were provided. It is important to note that there are various
sub categories in the 802.15.4 standard. Each subcategory has very specific applica-
tion scenarios such as RFID, smart utility networks or industrial applications. The
802.15.4 devices differ from Bluetooth devices in that the former is constrained to
the PHY and MAC layer of the OSI model while the latter utilizes additional layers
present in the OSI model.
Albahar et al. [1] provided a survey on the bluetooth based MITM vulnerabilities.
The authors mainly talked about improving the process of SSP with their idea - the
Enhanced SSP (ESSP). The authors also presented general security guidelines when
dealing with MITM vulnerabilities. Papers [12], [3] provide detailed information on
the various Intrusion Detection Systems.
Hassan et al. [14] provided a comprehensive classification on Bluetooth attacks
and the diffferent types of malware that are lurking out in the Internet. Their paper
provided an illustration of Bluetooth attacks. Malwares that were discussed occurred
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mostly occur on Symbian OS. Andrea et al. [5] provided a threat classification for
IoT devices based on four classes of attacks. Further based on those classification, the
appropriate countermeasures were presented along with general framework on how
the future IoT devices can be secured. Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir [22] provided a
new taxonomy on the IoT attacks based on how the attacker deviates a feature from
its intended functionality. They also provided a case study of extended functionality
attacks on smart lights.
In comparison, our work provides a classification of threats specific to BLE-based
IoT devices. Countermeasures subject to threats of BLE-based IoT device were also
discussed. Finally we provide the latest research findings, which are more specific to
the target BLE-based IoT devices.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
We discussed in detail the background of BLE technology, explored the BLE protocol
stack, and the functionality of its associated components. Further, we analyzed the
common threats that BLE-based IoT devices face along with a meaningful classifica-
tion of those threats. An in-depth analysis of the various countermeasures that are
available to these IoT devices for the looming threats was also discussed. Finally, we
discussed the research trends that hold great potential for improving the functionality
and security of the BLE-based IoT devices.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
48
ATT Attribute Protocol
BD ADDR Bluetooth Address
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
BR/EDR Basic Rate/ Enhanced Data Rate
CSRK Connection Signature Resolving Key
CSV Comma Separated Value
DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
ECDH Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman
GAP Generic Access Profile
GATT Generic Attribute Profile
HCI Host Controller Interface
HDA Helper Data Algorithm
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
IRC Internet Relay Chat
IRK Identity Resolving Key
IRP Peer Identitiy Resolving Key
ISM Industrial, Scientific and Medical Standard
LL Link Layer
L2CAP Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
MAC Media Access Control
MITM Man in the Middle
NFC Near Field Communication
OOB Out Of Band
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PCB Printed Circuit Board
PIN Personal Identification Number
PUF Physically Unclonable Function
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RPA Resolvable Private Address
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator
SDIO Standard Input Output
SDN Software Defined Network
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
SSL Secure Socket Layer
SSP Secure Simple Pairing
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTP Trusted Third Party
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
WEP Wireless Encryption Protocol
WPA Wireless Protected Access
WPAN Wireless Personal Area Networks
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